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SYSTEM SAFETY IN STIRLING ENGINE DEVELOPMENT 
by H. Bankaitis 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department o f Energy has established a number of broad programs aimed 
at reducing highway fuel consumption. One of the programs addresses the 
Stirling engine propulsion system as a possible alternative to the conven-
tional spark-ignition engine. The objective of this program is the develop-
ment, by 1984, of a Stirling engine system having at least 30 percent improve-
ment in fuel economy (mpg) over production vehicles powered by conventional 
spark-ignition engines of the same weight and performance, based on equal Btu 
content of fuel used. 
Two aspects make this program unique. The first aspect is the Stirling 
cycle itself. The most pronounced characteristic of the Stirling engine is 
its external combustion heat source and closed-loop working gas arrangement to 
convert heat into work energy. Although almost any type of gas may be used as 
a working gas in the Stirling cycle, gaseous hydrogen, because of its heat 
transfer characteristics and resulting high power output, has been selected 
for use in the automotive Stirling engine application. The second aspect is 
the background of the Government-industry team implementing the program. It 
is a joint effort between the Government represented by a DOE-NASA team and an 
industry team repre sented by Mechanical Technology, Inc. (MTI), United 
Stirling of Sweden, and AM General (AMG). The engine development program is 
based on the extensive technological background knowledge and existing P-40 
Stirling engine hardware of United Stirling of Sweden acting as a subcontrac-
tor to MTI. AMG, a wholly owned subsidiary of American Motors Corp. CAMC) , is 
the subcontractor responsible for automotive selection and for integration and 
evaluation of United Stirling of Sweden-designed Stirling engines installed in 
passenger cars. 
To demonstrate the use of Stirling engines in passenger vehicles, to as-
sist in assessing the current state of technology, and to determine the poten-
tial problems associated with the installation and operation of Stirling en-
g ines in automobiles, it was desirable to make an early demonstration of a 
Stirling-engine-powe red passenger vehicle. Thus an existing nonautomotive 
P-40 Stirling engine originally designed as a stationary, laboratory "test 
bench" engine for development of auxiliaries, subsystems , and components was 
adapted for automotive powerplant evaluation and installed in a production 
vehicle, the 1977 Opel Rekord 2100 Diesel sedan. The objectives of the Opel 
Rekord - P-40 Stirling engine integration test have been successfully met 
(ref. 1). In addition, to show the suitability of a Stirling engine in a 
U.S.-manufactured car, AMC passenger cars were selected for P-40 integration 
and evaluation testing. These vehicles are now undergoing testing. 
The approach to the system safety aspects of this program has been two 
pronged. The first phase was the initial effort by the Lewis Research Center, 
which consisted of a top-level fault tree system safety assessment directed at 
one facet of the P-40 Stirling-engine-powered AMC vehicle. The second phase 
entails contractor's efforts during various phases of the Mod-l and subsequent 
e n g ine - desig n work. The efforts are very preliminary and are not yet properly 
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structured. United Stirling of Sweden has performed a limited failure modes 
and effects analysis (FMEA) on the intended air-fuel system. MTl has engaged 
MGA Research Corp., who has reviewed automotive Stirling engine safety is-
sues. The effort most applicable to and influential in automotive Stirling 
engine design is the ASE Mod-l design and performance audit by MTl's engineer-
ing staff. In this audit system safety issues across the board are addressed 
by chosen experts in an FMEA fashion. In this second and more complicated 
phase, emphasis should be placed on recognizing differences in language, units 
used, materials chosen, and vendor's capabilities as well as the problem of 
wor k ing with both mechanical and electronic functions, hydrogen effects on 
metals, and the complexities of tiers of project management. 
The first phase of this program is described in the remainder of this 
pape r. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The United Stirling of Sweden P-40 Stirling engine (a four-cylinder, 
double-acting, U-drive configuration) consists of an air preheater, a combus-
t or, a heater, an enclosed working gas, a regenerator, a cooler and a conven-
t ional drive unit (crossheads, connecting rods, crankshaft, and drive shaft 
lubrication) (fig. 1). All the other auxiliaries are similar to those used in 
conventional spark-ignition-engine-powered vehicles. The most pronounced 
c ha rac ter is tic of the Stirling engine is its external combustion heat source 
and closed- loop working gas arrangement to convert heat into work energy. 
Combustion air and fuel are continuously burned in the combustors, and are 
r egulated by an air-fuel control system shown in figure 2. The hot combustion 
ga se s are passed around the outside of the heater tubes and heat is trans-
fer red to the interior, enclosed working gas. The working gas moves back and 
for th be t ween the top hot space o f one cylinder and the cold bottom space of 
t he next cylinder, hence the double-acting principle. Passing between the top 
hot space of one cylinder and the cold bottom space of the next cylinder, the 
working gas relinquishes some of its heat content to a regenerator, which re-
leases the heat back into the gas upon its return from the cold space of the 
cylin der. A cooler is used to further c ool the gas prior to compression in 
t he cold bottom space of the cylinder. This action by the working gas pro-
v i d e s driving force for the pistons that is converted to shaft torque and 
power to the wheels. Increased engine power is obtained by increasing the 
wo rking gas pressure in the engine. Conversely, to decrease engine power the 
working gas pressure in the engine must be decreased. To accomplish these 
tas ks three separate, yet integral, systems are arranged to act in concert. 
These three systems are the mean-pressure power control system, the air-fuel 
t e mperature control system, and the electronic power control unit. 
The mean-pressure power control system is used to vary and control the 
wo rking-gas pressure in the Stirling engine cycle for driveability character-
is tics very similar to those of a conventional spark-ignition engine. The 
power control system consists of the working gas storage tank, the control 
va lve , and the working gas compressor. Figure 3 shows the power control sys-
tem; f igure 4 is a more detailed schematic of the total control system. To 
increase engine pressure, the working gas is allowed to flow from the storage 
t an k through the control valve to the engine. To decrease engine pressure, 
wo rk i ng gas is allowed to flow through control valve to the compressor and is 
the n pumped back to the storage tank. For a more rapid decrease in pressure, 
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the control valve short circuits the working gas between the cylinders. Thus 
the power control valve performs three functions: 
(1) supplies working gas to the engine. 
(2) removes working gas from the engine. 
(3) short circuits the working gas between the cylinders. 
These power demands on the engine, or pressure changes, result in a varying 
demand for heat in the working cycle of the engine, yet the heater temperature 
is kept constant. Thermocouple readings of the heater head tube temperature 
are converted to a signal controlling the position of the air throttle (fig. 
2). A feedback signal to electronics ensures a stable throttle position. The 
air-fuel ratio is then controlled by a Bosch K-Jetronic unit. 
The electronic power control unit is the link between the accelerator 
pedal and the power control system. The accelerator potentiometer signal is 
compared with engine speed and working gas pressure in the engine. Comparison 
of these signals triggers the servovalve (an integral part of the power con-
trol valve) to flow the working gas either to the engine or from the engine to 
the storage tank. Both engine speed and engine pressure signals are provided 
by transducers. 
THE WORKING GAS 
Although almost any type of gas can be used as the working gas in the 
S tirling cycle, gaseous hydrogen, because of its heat transfer characteristics 
and resulting high power output, has been selected for use in the automotive 
Stirling engine application. 
Approximately 100 g (1 liter) of gaseous hydrogen at a mean pressure of 
20 MPa (200 atm) is sealed within the engine while approximately 700 g (7 lit-
e rs) of gaseous hydrogen at approximately 20 MPa (200 atm) is in the storage 
bottle (fig. 5.). 
DEPLOYMENT 
Six P-40 Stirling engines are used in this phase of the program. Three 
o f the six engines are installed in demonstration vehicles: engine ASE-40-5 
~n the 1977 Opel Rekord, engine ASE-40-8 in the 1979 AMC Spirit and ASE-40-l 2 
~ n the AMC concord. The other engines are used as stationary R&D test beds at 
Lewis, MTI and United Stirling of Sweden. The P-40 Stirling engine will be 
phased out of this program by the Mod-l and Mod-2 automotive Stirling engines 
( ASE) • 
SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
The NASA Stirling Engine Project Of ice has required that contractors make 
s a f ety considerations an integral part of all phases of the Stirling engine 
pro g ram. However, regarding the P-40 Stirling engine, total implementation of 
t he requirements was not feasible because the engine had been designed by 
Un i ted Stirling of Sweden with their own funding and no further refinements or 
r edesigns had been contemplated as part of this program. This is not to imply 
t hat the engine is unsafe, prone to catastrophic failures, or poorly de-
s i gned. On the contrary, it seems to be a well-designed piece of hardware 
t hat is being adapted for applications originally not anticipated by the de-





the need for assessment of the engine's safety aspect. In addi tion, the ini-
tial P-40 system safety assessment will provide insight into the extent and 
type of system safety analysis that will be necessary during ASE Mod-l and 
Mod-2 engine design phases. 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT - APPROACH, LIMITATIONS, AND ANALYSIS 
Approach 
Fault tree analysis (top level), which has been developed as a tool for 
system safety analysis, is designed to ferret out circumstances that a system 
may not have been designed to handle and for which some additions or modifica-
tions are needed to minimize risks of serious accident. The major advantage 
in using this particular technique is that the analysis can begin at any point 
(level) and can be extended as far as knowledge permits or suspended upon 
reaching a point of diminishing returns. By then a good basis for singling 
out the basic failure modes that deserve special attention should have been 
identified. At the single-component level this analysis technique is not dis-
tinguishable from reliability analysis. This may be used to calculate the 
probability of functional failure under circumstances not envisioned by the 
designer and to indicate design modifications necessary to minimize risks of 
hardware failure. 
Top-level fault tree system saftety assessment was employed in a highly 
qualitative effort directed at one facet of the total P-40 Stirling-engine-
powered AMC vehicles, namely the enclosed gas system. In the presented analy-
sis, the probability of functional failure cannot be calculated because of the 
lack of component durability history. These data are now being accumulated 
and will be considered as an input into a more complete system safety analysis 
in the future. Top-level fault ~rees or other system safety analysis tech-
niques must also be employed when assessing future Stirling engines, major 
systems, subsystems, and components during their respective design phases. 
Definition of Top-Level Undesirable Effect 
As described earlier the P-40 Stirling engine is an external combustion 
engine using gaseous hydrogen at high pressure and temperature as a working 
fluid to yield propulsive energy to a vehicle. The engine must function with 
the gaseous hydrogen working fluid contained within the system hardware de-
signed for the purpose and be responsive to the operator's commands without 
endangering the well being of the operator, passengers, bystanders, or hard-
ware. Thus the most undesired event for this segment of the P-40/Spirit sys-
tem safety assessment is defined as fol l ows: 
"Explosion and/or fire due to unprogrammed, nonpredictable 
loss of the gaseous hydrogen working fluid." 
Top-Level fault tree logic 
Thus a fault tree (fig. 6 - displays 1-3) has been constructed by logi-
cal ly relating possible sequences of events that, if they occur, could result 




Limitations of analysis 
It is important at this point to emphasize the limitations of this analy-
sis. These limitations stem from the fact that the current P-40 engine is a 
stationary, bench-type experimental engine. Because of its highly experimen-
tal nature, NASA, MTl, and United Stirling of Sweden do not have all the 
necessary data or information pertaining to the engine. Furthermore some of 
the information about the P-40 engine is considered proprietary by United 
Stirling of Sweden and not available to the analyst. Therefore this analysis 
1.S limited by 
(1) Consideration of the enclosed working gas system only 
(2) Lack of operating and maintenance procedures, manuals, or instruc-
tions 
(3) Very limited information on design specifications, test specifica-
tions, and component characteristics, materials, qualifications, etc. 
(4) Unknown changes being made by United Stirling of Sweden in compo-
nents, configuration, and materials 
(5) Lack of direct contact with the systems and equipment designers re-
sponsible for the product 
(6) Lack of a complete, comprehensive, and accurate set of system draw-
1.ngs 
(7) Exclusion of human error in maintenance or operation of the engine 
The basis source of information for this segment of the safety assessment 
consists of 
(1) United Stirling of Sweden schematic of the Stirling engine 
(2) Figures and descriptions in MTI progress and topical reports (ref. 1) 
(3) Existing failure reports (refs. 2 to 5) 
(4) Private communications with Lewis, MTI, and United Stirling of 
Sweden project and test engineering personnel 
(5) Information regarding Stirling engine hydrogen safety tests per-
formed by Stanford Research Institute and sponsored by Ford Motor 
Company (refs. 6 and 7) 
Analysis of Displays 
Display 1 (fig . 6). - The most undesired event may manifest itself either 
internally or externally to the engine. The events can take place when the 
engine is in the normal operating state (event R-2) including startup and 
shutdown sequences or when the engine is dormant (event R-3). Aside from the 
stresses induced by the normal operating cycle of the engine on its materials, 
parts, and components, an unevaluated source of additional stress is involve-
ment of the vehicle in a collision or submitting it to unduly harsh road con-
ditions or other vibrational environments (event D-l). The effects of a col-
lision or an unusual vibration-shock environment cannot be fully assessed at 
this time because sufficient data are not yet available. The same is true for 
events D-2 and D-3. Further studies should be performed to properly evaluate 
the impact of events D-l, D-2, and D-3 on the system. 
Considering event R-3, which takes place while the engine is in the non-
operating condition, event R-3.1 can only occur if catastrophic failure X-lor 
X- 2 takes place. However, some type of timely and proper-magnitude ignition 










individual designation (F I , F2, F3, etc.) of the conditions is based on 
the differences in probability of an ignition source occurring at the proper 
time with r e spect to gaseous hydrogen concentration. The ignition source can-
n o t be specifically identified but could range from a cigarette or open flame 
to an activation of a sparking relay switch or even static charge produced by 
hi g h-pressure gaseous hydrogen rushing over a sharp metallic point or edge. 
Con s idering the event designated by R-2, which takes place during the 
o pe r a ting mode, it appears that the most undesired event may manifest itself' 
e it he r internally to the engine (event R-4) or externally to the engine (event 
R- S) . These events are represented in more detail in subsequent subdisplays. 
Display 2 (fig. 6). - The most undesirable R-I event internal to the en-
g ine (event R-4) may take place in the combustor (R-4.l), crankcase (R-4.2), 
or cooling system (R-4.3). An event in R-4.3 (D-4) is deferred to further 
study . Occurrence of R-4.3 seems possible if interface bolt and seal failure 
can o ccur. The extent of overpressurization of the cooling system to yield a 
pre s s ure burst was not evaluated. This event might be a good candidate for 
further study and assessment. However, porosity in the cooling water jacket 
(fai lu r e X-4) and subsequent release of hydrogen gas into the cooling water 
s y stem ha s been experienced. Occurrence of this event emphasizes the need to 
carefully sel e ct and closely control the manufacturing process as well as to 
u s e prope r and e ffective nondestructive testing methods to facilitate accep-
ta nce of the part s. 
Se a l system failure, X-3, would have to occur to allow hydrogen gas to 
e nter t he c r an kcase. A schematic of the seal system is presented in fig-
ure 7 . Alt houg h rotating machinery is present, its lubricating fluid most 
l i kely would pr e vent the occurre nce of a friction spark or other type (includ-
i n g ho t surface ) of i gnition. In operational failures of this type experi-
e nced to da t e , leakage through th \ s seal resulted in an unacceptable loss of 
e ithe r engin e powe r or maintainability o f the required working gas pressure, 
thus leading t o an orderly engine shutdown by the operator . Prolonged opera-
t ion at t hat c ondition most likely would lead to degradation of the lubrica-
ting flu id thro ugh hydrogenation and to gaseous hydrogen being vented from the 
crankcas e to e ithe r the e ngine compartment or the immediate surroundings of 
the vehicle . 
In e ve nt R-4.l, gaseous hydrogen release may occur during the startup 
sequence ( event R-4.l), during the engine operating sequence (event R-4.1.2), 
or e ven du r i ng the engine shutdown sequence (event R- 4.l.3) when residual heat 
i n the eng ine is still prominent. These events are detailed in displays 2A, 
2B, and 2e, r e spectively. Most frequent causes for such occurrences would be 
mat e rial fa ilures , improper workmanship, or maintenance inattention. Effects 
o f the gas eous hy drogen containment-wall failures during the startup sequence 
would depend on t he extent of failure. I f a slow leak is taking place, it is 
c onceivabl e t hat the system could be pressurized to attempt a start, but then 
i t woul d be necessary for the purging cycle to fail (F7) to produce unde-
s ired even t R-l. A large, sudden leak prior to activating the igniter in the 
combustor wo u ld most likely cause an automatic abort because of pressure 
drop . S t il l it is likely that some rotating blower, switch spark, or static 
discharge could cause detonation in the combustor. 
Wi t h r e spect to f ailure X-B, t he reportedly seamless heater head tubes 
c ontain ing gaseous hy drogen are no t really seamless. These tubes are manufac-
tured by ro lling plat e material into a tube, welding the seam, and then draw-
i ng the t ube t o t h e desired diame te r , thus obliterating the seam weld. 
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Display 3 (fig. 6). - This display exhibits events leading to the pres-
ence of unrestrained gaseous hydrogen external to the engine (event R-S). The 
event may occur in the engine compartment only (event R-S.l), in the passenger 
compartment (event R-S.2), and in the external perimeter of the vehicle (event 
R-S.3). 
Failures leading to event R-S.I are of catastrophic nature, with the ex-
ception of 0-7. Location of the crankcase vent is determined by the designer, 
and its contribution to event R-S.I depends on the aforementioned seal system 
failure eX-3). This can vary for different engine designs. Failures X-12 and 
X-13 have not been experienced to date. Failure X-14 has been experienced 
quite often and damages, failure modes, and effects are well documented in 
reference 3 and in routine failure notice reports (form NASA-C-S91). 
Fire and detonation experienced with an X-14 failure have been easily 
contained by the engine compartment enclosures. However, NASA test engine 
experience clearly shows that check-valve failures result in metallic check-
valve parts being lodged in various valve seats, regenerators, and line fil-
ters, causing these components to work improperly or to fail completely. 
Event R-5.2 is cause for concern because gaseous hydrogen cannot be de-
tected by smell or sight, thus its presence of 4 percent in the air mixture 
presents a real danger to the operator and the passengers. This problem is 
further compounded if smoking is permitted inside the demonstrator vehicle. 
For the P-40/Spirit the most likely cause of event R-S.3 is failure 
X-19. As shown in figure 8 the gaseous hydrogen storage bottle with its asso- r 
ciated fittings and supply line is located in the left front wheel well of the 
vehicle. Neither the high-pressure hydrogen storage bottle nor the fittings 
and line have any protection against debris impact. This situation if not 
corrected could lead to catastrophic failure of the fitting or line by impact, 
thus releasing approximately 7 liters of high-pressure gaseous hydrogen. Even 
if no other ignition source was present, static discharge over sharp points 
would most certainly cause fire (event R-l). 
The X-19 and X-2 failures in event R-S.3.1 can also be caused by the 
failure of storage bottle holding mounts. This would allow the storage bottle 
to drop onto the wheel, possibly rupturing the bottle but most certainly 
b r eaki ng the high-pressure line. 
Failures X-17 and X-18 would occur only if the valve packing or valve 
body catastrophically failed, thus instantaneously releasing the whole storage 
content. A combination of high gas pressure and sharp edges of failed valve 
body or packing could provide an electrostatic ignition source, thus resulting 
in the most undesired event CR-l). 
Accidental dumping of gaseous hydrogen by untimely activation of dump 
valve (failures X-IS and X-16, event R-S.3.l) may be caused by a combination 
of electronic signal occurrences. 
Evaluation of Fault Tree 
The constructed fault tree as presented (fig. 6) is only a qualitative 
safety assessment of one facet of a Stirling engine system. Quantitative mea-
surement can only be obtained through experimental data that reveal component 
f ailure rate. The qualitative results include the critical paths of the fault 
tree and the qualitative importances of the component failures on the fault 
tree . The critical paths are defined as the combinations of component fail-
ures that will cause system failure. The qualitative importance gives a rank-
ing to each component with regard to its contribution to system failure. 
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To facilitate analysis of the fault tree critical paths, a set of Boolean 
equations can be derived·':f.or each of the failure modes: 
Rl R2 + R3 
R2 R4 + RS + Fl . Dl + F2 . D2 + F) . D3 
R3 F4 . (R3.l + Dl + D2) 
R3.1 = Xl + X2 
R3 F4 . (Xl + X2 + Dl + D2) 
R4 R4.l + R4.2 + R4.3 
R4 . l R4.1.l + R4.1.2 + R4.1. 3 
R4.1. 1 = 11 · F7 . (XS + R4.1. 1. 1) 
R4 .l.1.1 =X6 + X7 + Xs 
R4 . 1. 1 = 11 · F7 . (Xs + X6 + X7 + X8) 
R4 .1.2 = 11 · (Xg + XlO + Xs + Xll + X6 + X7 + X8) 
R4.1.3 12 · (Ds + D6 + R4.1.3.1) 
R4 . 1.3 . l .1 = X6 + X7 + X8 
. 
R4 . 1. 3 = 12 ·(DS + D6 + Xg + XIO + Xs + XII + X6 + X7 + X8) 
R4.l = [ I I • F7(XS + X6+X7 + XS) + II • (X9 + 
R4 . 2 Fs· (X3) 
R4.3 F6 · ( D4 + X4) 
Subs t i tuting equa t ions (6) to (8) into equation (Sa) yields 
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RS = RS.I + RS.2 + RS.3 
RS.I = 13 • FS • (07 + Xl2 + X13 + X14) 
RS.2 = 14 • RS.2.1 
R 5.2.1 = Os + 09 
RS.2 14 ' (OS + 09) 
RS.3 = F9 • (X2l + X2 + X20 + XIS + X19 + Xl7 + 
RS.3.1.1) 
RS• 3 • 1•1 = XIS + X16 + 15 • 010 
RS.3 = 1'<F9 • [(X2l + X2 + X20 + XIS + X19 + Xl7) + 
XIS + X16 + IS • Ololi 
RS = l(I3 • FS . (07 + X12 + Xu + X14) + 
14 • (OS + 09) + F9 • [(X2l + X2 + X20 + XIS + X19 + 
Xl7) + XIS + X16 + IS • DI01~ 
Then substituting equations (9) and (II) into equation 
R2 II I • F7 • (XS + X6 + X7 + XS) + 
• 
II • (X9 + XlO + Xs + Xu + X6 + X7 + X8) + 
(2) yields 
X14) + 14 • (OS + 09) + F9 • [X21 + X2 + X20 + X18 + X19 + 
X17 + XIS + X16 + 15 • 010] + Fl • 01 + F2 • 02 +, F3 • 03)t 
Substituting equation (12) for R2 and equation (4) for R3 in eq'uation (1) 
gives the final equation for Rl: 
Rl = lil • F7 • (XS + X6 + X7 + X8) + 
II • (X9 + XIO + Xs + XII + X6 + X7 + X8) + 12 • (05 + 
06 + X9 + XIO + Xs + X6 + XII + X7 + X8) + FS • (X3) + 














X17 + XIS + X16 + (IS • DIO») + Fl • Dl + F2 • D2 + 
F3 • 03 + F4 • (Xl + X2 + 01 + 02>t 
From equation (13) for the final event Rl. minimal cut sets or critical 
paths can be established within the set of all possible failures . A minimal 
cut set or critical path is the smallest combination of basic events that must 
occur to cause the top event to develop. These cut sets can be ranked in 
terms of most likely failure modes once component failures within them are 
known. Thus the likelihood of event Rl occurring by a particular cut set or 
critical path can be established. This is given by the sum of the cut-set 
probabilities. A listing of the events that comprise a particular cut set 
leading to event Rl is presented as follows: 
(1) Fl with Dl 
( 2) F2 wi t h D2 
(3) F3 with D3 
( 4) F4 with Xl. X2. Dl. D2 
( 5) FS with X3 
( 6) F6 with D4 X4 
(7) 11 and F 7 with XS. X6. X7. Xa 
( a) 11 with X9, XlO. Xs, Xu. X6, X7. Xa 
( 9) 12 with DS. X9, XIO, XS. Xu' X6, X7, Xa , D6 
0O) 13 and Fa with D7, Xl2, Xu. X14 
(1) 14 with Da, D9 
(2) F9 with X2l. X2, X20. Xla. X19, Xl7, XIS' XI6 
( 13) IS and F9 with DIO 
By applying engineering judgment to the likelihood of the occurrence of 
both a basic failure mode and an ignition source as discussed previously. 
events within each listing can be r anked from most to least likely as follows: 
(1) 11 1n combination with Xs. X6. X7. Xa. Xg, XIO. Xll 
( 2) 12 1n combination with XS. X6. X7. XS. Xg. XlO. XU. 
°S· D6 
(3) 14 1n combination with DS' D9 
( 4) F9 1n combination with X19 • Xl7' X2l. X18' XIO. X2. 








( 5) F4 1n combination with Xl' X2, D1, D2 
( 6) Fr in combination with Dl 
(7) F2 1n combination with D2 
( 8) F6 1n combination with X4, D4 
( 9) FS 1.n combination with X) 
(0) F) 1.n combination with D) 
(11) 11 · F7 in combination with X5' X6' X7, X8 
(2) 13 · F8 in combination with X14. XU. Xl2. D7 
( 13) F9 
· IS 1.n combination with 010 
Further evaluation of the significance of these events would include con-
s ideration of the mode of their occurrence. An internal event may be undesir-
a b l e, but because it occurs internally to the system and limits damage only to 
ha r dware, it may be judged less significant. An event that occurs externally 
t o the system and may involve injury to personnel may be considered very sig-
n i f icant and be submitted to a much more rigorous evaluation. 
DISCUSSION and RECOMMENDATIONS 
The P-40 Stirling engines installed in AMC vehicles are almost identical 
t o the P-40 engine used to power the Opel Rekord as described in MTI topical 
r eport (Ref. 1). From this analysis and the experience with P-40 Stirling 
engines the following conc l usions were drawn: 
The P-40 engine is not prone to structural catastrophic failures even 
when it is enduring drastic changes of operating conditions or component 
ma l funct i on. 
The eng i ne functions are closely monitored by strategically located sen-
sors. 
The electronic control unit is designed to interpret loss of any sensor 
signal as a command for a normal shutdown. 
\ 
The check valves used in the initial versions of the P-40 eng1.nes have 
fa il ed due to breakage of spring, disk retaining cages and O-rings. Re-
cen t ly, United Stirling of Sweden redesigned the check valves, and limi-
ted exper1 e nce indicates that such failures are less likely to occur. 
The hazards of hydrogen fire or detonation cannot be overemphasized and 
are descr i bed in numerous publications such as reference 8. The inherent 
danger of fire is much greater when the engine is running and the engine 
compartment hood is raised to facilitate engine inspection during public 
demonstrat i ons. To minimize the risk of hydrogen fire injury to the ob-
servers, an interlock between the engine compartment hood and the igni-
tion key in the passenger compartment has been installed in the demon-
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stration vehicles. This interlock prohibits engine operation with the 
hood raised. However, it must be pointed out that the lockout can be 
circumvented while performing engine maintenance. Thus, in public demon-
strations of the vehicle the operator must strictly adhere to the pre-
scribed operating procedure. 
Installation of the hydrogen storage bottle and supply line unErotected 
from the environment in the left front wheel well of the vehicles is very 
poor 
a. Because the storage bottle, fitting, and supply line are subjected 
to corrosion and possible impact damage from road debris. The fit-
ting and supply line are especially vulnerable and are thus highly 
prone to catastrophic failure. The environment to which these com-
ponents are exposed enhances the risk of catastrophic structural 
failure. 
b. Because failure of the straps anchoring the storage bottle would 
cause the bottle to drop and most certainly rupture the high-
pressure supply line, causing sudden discharge of high-pressure gas-
eous hydrogen. The escaping hydrogen can be ignited or detonated by 
a spark or by heat generated by rupture. 
c. In case of collision the structural integrity of the mounts and the 
storage bottle itself may be compromised, but most likely the struc-
tural integrity of the fitting and the high-pressure line would be 
compromised, leading to a rapid release of the storage bottle con-
tent. 
Experience to date with the hydrogen storage bottle and their structural 
characteristics appear to be very favorable. The hydrogen storage bottle at 
15° C and 300-atm pressure has a bottle wall stress of 77 ksi. On the basis 
of yield strength of 140 ksi, a safety factor of 1.8 exists. On the basis of 
proof pressure of 450 atm and the resulting 116-ksi stress in the bottle wall, 
a safety factor of 1.2 is still provided. These factors were verified by 
Lewis in a single rupture test of the Opel Rekord hydrogen storage bottle af-
ter about 18 months of continuous use in -the vehicle. 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI), sponsored by the Ford Motor Co., in 
1973 and 1976 conducted an independent study of hydrogen safety of Stirling 
engines (refs. 6 and 7). Although the quantities of hydrogen gas used in SRI 
tests may not be the same as that used in the P-40 engine, the ,behavior of 
hydrogen-air mixtures, their ignition and detonation characteristics, and dam-
age to the hardware experienced with P-40 engines parallels closely the obser-
vations by SRI. The SRI studies (refs. 6 and 7) clearly state that 
Hydrogen fires within the engine proper in many cases may be considered 
nonhazardous. 
Signifi cant hazard of fire or explosion occurs only as a result of a very 
rapid release of gaseous hydrogen. 
Occurrence of fire or explosion for such a maSS 1 ve hydrogen release depend s 
enti rely on the timing and location of ignition sources. 
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With a standard hood significant explosive effects were limited to tests 
with the ignition source under the hood. Maximum ~ressure of 4.58 pS1 was 
recorded outside the vehicle. 
With a louvered hood somewhat lower maX1mum shock overpressures were ob-
served for ignition beneath the hood. 
Although the quantity of hydrogen used in the Stirling cycle is consider-
ably (possibly 2000 times) less than the quantity of gasoline, the following 
1S still recommended for the Stirling engine vehicles: 
To minimize ignition sources under the hood, no electrical component should 
be capable of ign~ting the gas mixture surrounding the equipment. 
The hydrogen storage bottle should be caged, possibly with antishrapnel 
net, and anchored so that it does not propel into the passenger compartment or 
outside vehicle envelope in case of catastrophic failure of the fitting. 
For hydrogen bottle installations in vehicle wheel wells the hard supply 
line should be replaced with a suitable flexible line and caged to protect it 
from road debris impact. 
Smoking in the passenger compartment or in the immediate vicinity of the 
demonstration vehicle should not be allowed. 
Vehicle demonstration rides should be limited to closely controlled, 
sparsely traveled traffic areas. This recommendation might be withdrawn if 
the behavior of the vehicle during involvement in an accident is clearly de-
fined and the recommendations on the storage bottle and supply line are imple-
mented. 
The operator should brief the passengers on how to quickly exit from the 
demonstration vehicle in case an emergency arises. 
The contractor should generate maintenance procedures for the Stirling en-
g1ne and ensure that these procedures are not violated. 
In the future it is advisable that the following actions be taken: 
Perform detailed system safety analysis using the fault tree technique, 
fai lure modes and effects analysis, or other appropriate techniques of all new 
designs (Mod-I, Mod-2, reference engine) and any design modifications. These 
studies should be continuously updated and form the basis for hardware manu-
factu re and buildup and maintenance and operation, inspection, and acceptance 
procedures. This is to be accomplished by personnel capable and experienced 
1n system safety analysis. 
Perform suitable system safety analyses of the existing hardware modifica-
tions prior to accomplishing them. 
Investigate the feasibility of using metal-lined, fiberglass-filament-wound 
bottles for storage of the gaseous hydrogen. Lewis has been investigating us e 







useful data. In addition, use of such bottles would m1n1m1ze shrapnel 1n the 
event of catastrophic structural failure. 
Design the shape of the storage bottle and locate it in the vehicle enve-
lope such that in the event of catastrophic failure of the fitting the bottle, 
if propelled, would be ejected dmo/nward into the shrapnel retaining net or in 
the worst case into the pavement within the vehicle envelope but not near the 
passenger compartment. 
Eliminate all possible fittings, connections, or external hydrogen supply 
lines that surround the current P-40 engines. 
Investigate the possibility of odorizing the hydrogen gas used in the 
Stirling cycle. This will alert persons handling Stirling-engine-powered ve-
hicles of potential hydrogen gas problems in a manner that gasoline or fuel 
odor alerts us in present internal combustion engine cars. 
Determine the immediate and induced effects exerted on the Stirling-
engine-powered vehicle system by a wide range of catastrophic collision ener-
g i e s. 
The aforementioned potential problems are real and cannot be treated 
lightly. They have been experienced with P-40 engines and were also indepen-
dently evaluated for SRI tests under highly controlled conditions. From ex-
perience it is evident that the P-40 engine is structurally capable of power-
i n g an automobile. Hydrogen leakages internal to the engine do not seem to 
p r e sent serious danger to hardware, facilities, or personnel. Hydrogen leak-
ag e external to the engine does present a certain amount of hazard to hardware 
and more of a hazard to personnel. The hazard to hardware on the basis of 
e xperience to date is minimal and quite acceptable. The hazard to personnel 
i s difficult to accurately assess, in general, and therefore, preliminary 
qualitative system safety considerations obviously can only be approximated. 
The analysis presented in this report covers only one facet of the total 
S t i rling engine system. In addition to hydrogen-failure-mode fault tree anal-
y s i s, similar analyses are necessary on such subsystems as the pressurized 
c o o ling jacket, electronic circuitry, and power control valves. Fault tree 
a nalysis combined with failure modes and effects analysis and failure rate 
data can provide a proper reliability assessment of the Stirling engine system. 
The primary challenge for the designer of automotive Stirling engines is 
the production of a reliable, environmentally acceptable operational engine 
sy stem that meets the program objectives. In meeting this challenge, the de-
s igner is faced with multiple design requirements that must be satisfied dur-
i ng the design process. In view of the potential safety problems that can be 
presented by hydrogen used as the working gas and the electronic control sys-
tems and multiplicity of acceptable practices as perceived by the team members 
i mplementing the program, the designer must be keenly aware of the importance 
of system safety. From the outset of the program the designer must address, 
in a formal and disciplined way, the issues associated with safety of hard-
ware, safety of the environment, and above all safety of the public. The 
DO E-NASA Stirling Engine Project Office has required that contractors make 
s afety considerations an integral part of all phases of the Stirling engine 
de velopment program. As an integral part of each engine design subtask, anal-
y ses are being evolved to determine possible modes of failure. The accepted 
sy stem safety analysis techniques (fault tree, FMEA, hazards analysis, etc.) 
-14-
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are being applied in various degrees of extent at the system, subsystem, and 
component levels. The primary objectives are to identify critical failure 
a reas, to enable removal of susceptibility to such failures or their effects 
f rom the system, and to minimize risk. 
Even though the design and concept verification is in its infancy, apply-
i ng s y stem safety techniques has already resulted in successfully identifying 
a reas of concern. Subsequent reevaluation of design yielded changes improving 
the h a r d ware and defined procedures assuring personnel safety. These analys es 
will be updated as the development program progresses. 
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Figure 1. - Cross-sectional schematic of P-40 Stirl ing engine. 
Figure 2. - Schematic of Stirling engine combustor and air-fuel control system. 
------ - ---- -----
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Figure 3. - Schematic of Stirling engine power control system. 
14 
fiJlure 4. - Detailed schematic of Stirling engine power control system. 
TlIlED SUPPLY SYSTEK 
SUPPLY. DUMP AND SHORT-CIRcun VALVE BLl>e J( 
HOOC ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE 
OIL PUMP 
OIL TAHJ: 
RIllE' VALVJ: (CONSTANT PRfSSURI VALVE) 
OIL FILTER 
NITROGEN fILLED AcclIHUUToa 
fEEDBACK POTENTIOMETER 
10 IIYDROCEN COHPRISSOR 
11 CIlE ex VALVES 
12 COKPReSSOR SUORT-CIRCUIT VALVE 
13 CAS cooua 
14 UYDROCEN STORAGE VESSEL 
15 SHUTOff VALVE 
16 EUCTRONIC CONTaOL lJl(lT 
17 ACCEURATOR IIITU POTflITIOKETER 
18 SPEED TRANSDUCER 
19 PRISSURE TRANSIlUCU (KAXI/fIIH PRISSURE) 
20 SAfETY VALVE llWlJ./fIIH PReSSURE) 
21 EMERGENCY VALVE AND EXl'EllIAI. D\IIIP ING VAL" ~ 
22 EMERGEHCY VALVE 
23 PRISSURE TRANSDUCER (TANI: PRESSIIIl£) 
24 SAfETY VALVJ: (TAHJ( PRESSURe) 
25 GAS REFILLING VALVE 
-1 
Figure 5. - Hydrogen storage bottle. 
Capacity, 7.0 to 7.3 liters; operating 
pressu re, 300 atm; proof pressu re, 
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